94Ha Viewpoint
Since its birth, the European Union has undergone seven expansions and has achieved three important transformations in terms of integration, from the European Coal and Steel Community to the European Community and then to the European Union. The above history and reality have made everyone from national leaders to scholars and journalists regard the European Union as a country. However, this political entity, which is highly similar to a country in both form and spirit, is just a highly integrated international organization. Limited by its own fatal flaws that are difficult to overcome, its strategic autonomy is almost as weak as Bhutan.
Europe’s strategic autonomy has attracted much attention against the backdrop of the intensified strategic competition between China and the United States and Trump’s victory in the election. Lianhe Zaobao·Opinion published articles such as Zhang Yun’s “European Strategic Autonomy and Sino-European Relations” (May 16) and Xiong Hao’s “US Election and European Strategic Autonomy” (November 16), discussing the role of Europe’s strategic autonomy in the strategic triangle relationship between China, the United States and Europe and the US strategy. The author believes that the discussion of Europe’s strategic autonomy must clarify two premises: first, the scope of Europe’s reference; second, does Europe really have strategic autonomy?
First, define the scope of Europe. At present, the term Europe mainly refers to four different objects. One is the geographical scope. Although the majority of Russia’s population is distributed in Europe, in terms of geographical scope, it is a Eurasian country rather than just a European country. Second, cultural and sports activities. Taking the European Football Championship (abbreviated as the European Championship or the European Cup) as an example, Asian countries such as Turkey are also included in it. Third, ideology. Influenced by the Cold War, the term Europe in the context of ideology mainly refers to the European member states of NATO during the Cold War, and does not include former socialist countries in Eastern Europe, Southern Europe or Soviet republics that joined after the end of the Cold War. In this sense, Europe mainly refers to Western Europe, including the United Kingdom. Fourth, geopolitics. Against the backdrop of intensified strategic competition between China and the United States and increasingly clear world political camps, Europe mainly refers to the European Union. Since the United Kingdom after Brexit closely follows the United States in foreign policy, its nature is more like the shadow of the United States in Europe, rather than a substantive independent country. Double-headed eagle Russia, although its culture belongs to Christianity in a broad sense, has completely become hostile to the European Union after the Crimean crisis and the Russo-Ukrainian war. The European Union in this sense also does not include Switzerland, Georgia, Serbia and other countries. Obviously, the “Europe” mentioned in the above two articles mainly refers to the European Union, especially the European Union after Brexit.
The second and more important question is, does the strategic autonomy of the European Union really exist? Or, how big is the strategic autonomy of the European Union? The so-called lack of strategic autonomy refers to a country or a group of countries that cannot independently make decisions on domestic and foreign affairs that are related to their own major interests due to interference from foreign powers or collective countries. In the international community, small or weak countries will sacrifice strategic autonomy in exchange for national security when their national security is seriously threatened. For example, the small landlocked country of Bhutan recognized India’s guidance through a formal treaty in exchange for India’s security protection.
Since its birth, the European Union has undergone seven expansions and has achieved three important transformations in integration from the European Coal and Steel Community to the European Community and then to the European Union. At present, there are seven major institutions in the European Union, including the European Parliament, the Council of the European Union, and the European Central Bank. The eurozone has achieved monetary unification and has certain common foreign and defense policies. Affected by the exchange rate, in 2023, the EU’s nominal GDP will reach 18.34 trillion US dollars (about 26 trillion Singapore dollars), making it the world’s second largest economy after the United States. The euro is one of the world’s major currencies. The EU has a population of 449 million, 100 million more than the United States. France, a core member state, is one of the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. At the same time, the EU often participates in important international conferences such as the G20 and the G7 as a single entity.
Three major contradictions
The above history and reality have made everyone from national leaders to scholars and journalists regard the EU as a country. However, this political entity, which is highly similar to a country in both form and spirit, is just a highly integrated international organization. Limited by its own fatal flaws that are difficult to overcome, its strategic autonomy is almost as weak as Bhutan.
First, the contradiction between France and Germany. France and Germany are the two driving forces of the EU’s development. The two countries are relatively united in enhancing the unity and integration of the EU, but it has long been an open secret that the two countries are competing for the leadership of the EU. Although France’s GDP is smaller than Germany’s, with $3.03 trillion and $4.46 trillion respectively in 2023, France is one of the five permanent members of the United Nations and the only nuclear power in the EU. Germany enjoys a higher reputation in the EU than France due to its huge economic strength, but affected by the history of World War II, in addition to promoting EU integration in the political and economic fields, it is timid in the military and security fields.
France tried to use the EU to reproduce the glory of King Louis XIV and Napoleon, while Germany was more inclined to consolidate its position in the world economic map through the EU. This led to the EU’s integration development being concentrated in the economic field, the political field was only fragmented, and the military and security fields were stagnant. The contradiction between France and Germany is a congenital and fatal internal injury to the EU’s strategic autonomy.
Second, the contradiction between big countries and small countries. The three major countries of France, Germany and Italy, especially France and Germany, aim to enhance their influence in the EU and on the world stage through the continued expansion of the EU, while small countries want to achieve their own economic development by joining the EU. Small member states in the EU have pursued pragmatism both before and after joining the EU. When these small countries are faced with more attractive bargaining chips from big countries outside the EU, it is expected that they will sacrifice the interests of the EU in exchange for greater interests of their own countries.
Third, the contradiction between Southeast European countries and Western European countries. Southeast European countries are close to Russia. The special relationship with the Soviet Union during the Cold War and Russia’s style of doing things have led to these countries joining the EU. Although they have gained huge economic benefits, they still lack confidence in the EU in terms of security. The successive occurrence of the Crimean crisis and the Russo-Ukrainian war has led to economic interests temporarily taking a secondary position in these countries. Relatively speaking, Western European countries feel less security threats from Russia. The above differences between Southeast European and Western European countries have made it difficult for the EU to form cohesion on military security issues. When facing security crises such as the Russo-Ukrainian war, the EU can only rely on NATO, and strategic autonomy is more like a castle on the beach, with a name but no substance.
There is a widely circulated summary of the EU in academia: a giant in economy, a dwarf in politics, and a dwarf in military. The EU, especially the big member states, are well aware of their inherent fatal flaws. However, in the face of these inherent weaknesses, aren’t France and Germany willing but unable? There is no other way except shouting slogans and taking some insignificant peripheral measures.
(The author is a teacher at Sichuan International Studies University)
