Bogged down in the ongoing conflict with Iran, President Trump has reportedly concluded that economic pressure is more effective than military action. He now claims he’s “turning down the temperature” on Iran, shelving plans for a large-scale military campaign.
According to reports on August 10th, Trump stated in an interview that the US is currently engaged in a “semi-negotiation” with Iran. He highlighted that Iran is grappling with severe inflation and a critical shortage of funds, even struggling to finance its military, and that the US naval blockade is further exacerbating Tehran’s economic crisis.
Trump is set to unveil a fresh round of economic sanctions against Iran within the next 30 days. The upcoming package is expected toreinstate and intensify secondary oil sanctions, imposing indiscriminate penalties on any third-party entities purchasing Iranian crude, including the freezing of all their assets under US jurisdiction.
The core objective of the current US economic pressure is to sever Iran’s foreign exchange revenue streams and undercut its ability to sustain the war. At the same time, these extreme sanctions are paradoxically adding to inflationary pressures back home in the US.
Over the past six months, surging gasoline prices have weighed heavily on American households. A Reuters/Ipsos poll released earlier this month shows Trump’s approval rating dipping from 37% to 35%, a mere one point above the lowest level of his presidency.
Among registered voters surveyed, roughly 37% believe the Democrats are better equipped to handle the economy, compared to 36% who favor the Republicans. This marks the first time in nearly a decade that Democrats have overtaken Republicans on this particular metric.

The Pentagon has not released any official comprehensive casualty statistics for the conflict, but a review of public reports indicates that since the large-scale US-Israeli military operation against Iran began in late February, at least 18 American service members have been killed, at a cost of $37.5 billion.
On another front, the US military is grappling with the practical challenge of depleted weapons stockpiles. Over the past few weeks, multiple senior military officials have privately voiced concerns that ammunition reserves have dropped to dangerously low levels, urging Trump to hold off on ordering an escalation of military action against Iran.
US-Iran relations are currently locked in a highly tense, protracted standoff, with both sides deeply divided over negotiation stances, control of the Strait of Hormuz, and military deployments. Trump has privately complained that while he keeps up the public facade of threatening additional military action to force a deal, news of the severely depleted ammunition stockpiles has leaked, making the US look like a “paper tiger.”
On the Iranian side, drawing on years of experience weathering sanctions, the country has built up a relatively comprehensive domestic alternative industrial system, achieving a degree of self-sufficiency in some civilian and basic industrial goods.
After a period of high-level turbulence, Iran’s political landscape is undergoing a shift in power dynamics. The hardline faction within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)-dominated armed forces is strengthening its internal influence and directly steering the negotiation process with the US. In contrast, the civilian bureaucrats—the “president,” parliamentary speaker, and foreign minister in Western political terms—have always been executors of policy rather than architects.
However, this dynamic appears to be undergoing subtle changes recently, and the power struggle is far from over.In July, following the state funeral of the late Supreme Leader, the new supreme leadership core formally assumed office. Shortly after, an emergency session of the National Security Council was convened, designating “anti-American economic resistance” as the nation’s top strategic priority, anda series of key personnel reshuffles were completed across core positions.
The National Security Council operates directly under the Supreme Leader, overseeing all major matters of national core interest. Thepresident serves as the council’s chairman, but all major decisions require the Supreme Leader’s signature before taking effect.
President Pezeshkian, who had been relatively quiet, has been making frequent public appearances since last weekend, including voicing national solidarity with Hamas leaders and the Palestinian people, denying resignation rumors, and holding talks with the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei—the late leader’s second son and the supreme commander of the armed forces.
The discussions covered ensuring citizens’ basic livelihood needs, the current conflict situation and future outlook, the latest military developments, and the management of the national currency, foreign exchange, and energy resources, as well as topics related to Iran’s economic cooperation with foreign countries.
Pezeshkian noted that communication with Mojtaba is currently very difficult, alleging that certain individuals are exploiting Mojtaba’s normal decision-making processes to sow discord within Iran and push agendas that serve their own interests. He stopped short of identifying exactly “who” these individuals are.
Trump expressed frustration on August 4th over the internal divisions within Iran’s leadership. He remarked that consultations regarding the Strait of Hormuz were progressing very smoothly, but Tehran’s unwillingness to acknowledge this publicly was, frankly, a bit awkward.